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NOTES AND COMMENTS
"insuperable and unsurpassable hardship or difficulty in exercising some
constitutional right."20  The Court, unlike the Board, found no such
countervailing hardship or difficulty here.
With this decision, the Supreme Court has more clearly defined the
basic rule to be applied here. The employees' right to discuss self-
organization among themselves, as set out in Le Tourneau Co., has been
reaffirmed.21 In a situation where the employees spend the greater part
of their living as well as working time on the company property, the
employer may not prohibit the entrance of the union on the property for
organizational activity. 22 Nor may the entry be prohibited where the
company rule discriminates against the union.23 But, as the Court ruled
in the principal case, if the living quarters of the employees in town or
country are within reasonable reach of the union, no nonemployee access
to the company property has to be granted. Thus, the remaining question
is the factual one of what combination of distances and proportions of
employees will have to prevail before the employer is made to open
his doors to nonemployee organizers.
HENRY H. ISAACSON
Labor Law-State Jurisdiction Over Picketing
While the extent of the jurisdiction of a state to enjoin peaceful
picketing still remains uncertain,1 the United States Supreme Court in a
recent decision, United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board,2 made definite the power of a state to enjoin picketing
or other employee activity which assumes the form of violence or coer-
cion. The Court thus reaffirmed the reasoning in Allen Bradley v.
W.E.R.B.3 that otherwise an ".... intention of Congress to exclude the
states from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested." 4
If the U. A. W. case had involved an employer seeking to prevent
violence and destruction of property, by securing an injunction from a
state court acting under its traditional police power to preserve the gen-
eral order by preventing violence and breaches of the peace, the decision
167 F. 2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948); cf. NLRB v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 122 F. 2d
149 (2d Cir. 1941)
' Brief for Appellee Babcock & Wilcox Co., p. 17, NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcock Co., 351 U. S. 105 (1956).
'1 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105, 113 (1956) (dictum).
' NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F. 2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948);
Weyerhauser Timber Co., 31 N. L. R. B. 258 (1941).
" NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U. S. 226 (1949).
1 See Isaacson, Labor Relations Law: Federal versus State Jurisdiction, 42
A. B. A. J. 415 (1956) for discussion of pre-emption problems arising from the
Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act.
2 351 U. S. 266 (1956).
3315 U. S. 740 (1942).
' Id. at 749
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of the Supreme Court would have conformed to the jurisdictional pattern
which the Court apparently has been developing in recent cases concerned
with federal-state relationship in labor disputes. In the U. A. W. case,
however, more was involved than a state court exercising the police
power which the National Labor Relations Act5 does not preclude from
state action. It invloved an administrative board acting under statutory
authority from the state legislative body regulating labor-management
relations.
The Kohler Company of Wisconsin and the appellant union reached
an impasse in collective bargaining for a new contract. The production
workers struck and picketed the premises of the company. The Kohler
Co. filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
charging the union and its members with the commission of unfair labor
practices within the ineaning of the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act.0
On the authority of the Wisconsin Act, one provision of which made it an
unfair labor practice for employees to engage in mass picketing and other
coercive activities, 7 the state board ordered the union and certain
members to cease and desist from a fairly inclusive list of activities which
the board found to be coercive and intimidating. Simultaneously, the
board issued positive regulations limiting the number and conduct of
pickets. The board's order was enforced by a Wisconsin Circuit Court
and the judgment was affirmed by the state supreme court8 and the
United States Supreme Court.9
While Garner v. Teamsters Union'° denied the state's jurisdiction
to enjoin peaceful picketing where the conduct of the union would con-
stitute an unfair labor practice under the NLRA, state courts have
continued to enjoin union activity where violence or intimidation is
present as a valid exercise of the police power.' In the Garner case
'49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended 29 U. S. C. §§ 151-68 (1952), hereinafter
referred to as NLRA.
'Wis. STAT. 111.01 et seq (1953). The Wisconsin Act is a comprehensive
labor relations statute differing in parts and scope but generally patterned after
the federal act and administered by an agency similar to the National Labor Re-
lations Board.
7Wis. STAT. 111.06 (2) (1953).
"(2) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employe individually or in
concert with others:
"(a) To coerce or intimidate an employe in the enjoyment of his legal rights in-
cluding those guaranteed in sect. 111.04 or to intimidate his family, picket his domi-
cile, or injure the person or property of such employe or his family.
"(f) To hinder or prevent, by mass picketing, threats, intimidation, force, or
coercion of any kind the pursuit of any lawful work or employment, or to obstruct
or interfere with entrance to or egress from any place of employment, or to obstruct
or interfere with free and uninterrupted use of public roads, streets, highways, rail-
ways, airports, or other ways of travel or conveyance."
'U. A. W. v. W. E. R. B., 269 Wis. 578, 70 N. W. 2d 191 (1955).9 U. A. W. v. W. E. R. B., 351 U. S. 266 (1956).
10346 U. S. 485 (1953).
In Perez v. Trifilette, 74 So. 2d 100, 102 (Fla. 1954) ; cert. denied, 348 U. S.
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itself, the Supreme Court carefully limited the decision to the facts
presented by quoting from Allen-Bradley v. W. E. R. B.12 that the state
could still exercise "'. . . its historic powers over such traditionally local
matters as public safety and order . . .' [and also stating that] nothing
suggests the activity enjoined threatened a probable breach of the
state's peace or would call for extraordinary police measures by state or
city authority."' 3 In Erwin Mills v. Textile Workers Union,'4 decided
before Garner, but after amendments to the NLRA had determined
that certain union conduct could be an unfair labor practice, the North
Carolina Supreme Court found nothing in the NLRA or decisions
of the United States Supreme Court 15 to prevent a state court from
enjoining mass picketing or other violent conduct.',
In deciding the U. A. W. case, the United States Supreme Court
conceded that the enjoined conduct was a violation of section 8 (b) (1)
of the NLRA,17 that the Kohler Company was subject to that act,
and that the National Labor Relations Board' s could have issued an
order similar to the one issued by the state board. The appellant union
argued that while a state may, within its police power and under its ap-
plicable criminal statutes, restrain and punish violence, it should not be
permitted to exercise this reserved power through an agency concerned
primarily with labor relations and operating under a state statute which
seeks to effectuate a declared labor policy of the state. The Court, in
rejecting this argument, said that the inclusion of unfair labor practices
by unions in the NLRA did not make Allen-Bradley obsolete and
that "The fact that Wisconsin has chosen to entrust its power to a labor
926 (1955), the Florida court said ". . . it seems settled that while states are
precluded from applying their preventive labor law in controversies affecting
interstate commerce, their power to preserve the peace remains intact even though
it may be invoked in connection with a labor dispute."22 315 U. S. at 749.
"Garner v. Teamsters Union 346 U. S. 485, 488 (1953).
14234 N. C. 321, 67 S. E. 2d 372 (1951).
" The North Carolina court quoted at length from the so-called "Briggs-Strat-
ton" case, International Union v. W. E. R. B., 336 U. S. 245, 253-54 (1949),
where the United States Supreme Court upheld an order of the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board ordering a union and its members to cease from collectively
engaging in intermittent work stoppages. The Court said: "While the federal board
is empowered to forbid a strike when and because its purpose is one that the
federal act made illegal, it has no power to forbid one because its method is
illegal-even if the illegality were to consist of actual or threatened violence to
persons or destruction of property. Policing of such conduct is left to the
states.... This conduct is governed by the states or it is entirely ungoverned."
Id. at 328, 67 S. E. 2d at 379.
1,,. . . nothing . .. interferes . .. with the right of a state to exercise its
traditional police power to suppress violence,,to prevent breaches of the peace, to
prevent an employer and his employees from being intimidated by violence or the
threat of violence, or to protect property and to safeguard its lawful use during a
strike or labor dispute." Id. at 329, 67 S. E. 2d at 379.
17 61 STAT. 141 (1947) as amended 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (1) (1952).11 Hereinafter referred to as NLRB.
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board is of no concern to this court."'19 Three justices dissenting argued
that the majority was allowing a duplication of administrative remedies
which the Court had disallowed in Garner. The dissent reasoned that
the police power which the Court exempted from exclusive jurisdiction
of the NLRB was that traditional power which a state could have
exercised independently of any general state labor policy or specific
legislation. Apparently the dissenters had no objection to the state
protecting against the type of conduct in which the union had here en-
gaged, so long as the state did not award administrative relief similar to
that available from the NLRB.
The majority view, in so far as it allows the state to exercise its police
power to prevent violence in labor disputes, confirms what it had already
said in Garner.2 0  However, by allowing Wisconsin to implement this
power through a local administrative labor board, the Court takes a
position which seems inconsistent with the federal-state jurisdictional
relationship it had been developing in cases since the NLRA was
amended in 1947. Although the U. A. W. case can be distinguished
from Amalgamated Association v. W. E. R. B.,2 1 since there was no
issue of violent conduct in the latter, it would seem anomalous that a
state is completely powerless to prevent a crippling strike in a vital
public service affecting the community at large, and yet, may invoke the
full weight of its labor regulation machinery in an isolated case of mass
picketing or intimidation involving a small segment of the populace.
The U. A. W. case seems more consistent with the dissenting opinions
in earlier cases, which would have allowed the states a freer hand in labor
relations.22 The Court, however, indicates no desire to overrule those
earlier cases where the majority of the Court severely restricted state
interference. Thus, the Court seems to depart from the reasoning of the
earlier cases in situations where coercion and intimidation were present,
without modifying its rulings in those cases.
This may become clearer through a review of the Court's rulings on
the validity of state injunctions against union activity where no overt or
threatened acts of violence were involved.23 Even prior to Garner, the
"' U. A. W. v. W. E. R. B., 351 U. S. 266, 275 (1956).
0 "We have held that the state may still exercise its historic power over such
traditionally local matters as public safety and order and the use of the streets
and highways." Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, 488 (1954).
21340 U. S. 383 (1951), where the Court held that the NLRA precluded
Wisconsin from enjoining a peaceful strike in essential public services since § 7 of
the NLRA guarantees this right to employees.
I See Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538, 547-61 (1945) (dissenting opinion);
Amalgamated Association v. W. E. R. B., 340 U. S. 383, 399-410 (1951) (dissenting
opinion) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330
U. S. 767, 777-84 (1947) (separate opinion).
2 See Smoot, Stranger Picketing: Permanent Injunction or Permanent Litiga-
tion, 42 A. B. A. J. 817 (1956) for a discussion of the development of court rulings
on the validity of state injunctions against peaceful organizational picketing.
(Vol. 35
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Court held that peaceful picketing per se was not enjoinable unless some
other factor was present.2 4  Picketing was stripped of this protection,
however, when it lost its peaceful nature and took the form of force and
violence.25 The Court further limited the privilege of peaceful picketing
by allowing it to be enjoined if its purpose was to achieve an objective
contrary to declared state policy whether this was legislative or judicial.28
Under this limitation state courts were enjoining many union activities
which not only sought a result in violation of a state policy, but also
amounted to an unfair labor practice under the NLRA.2 7  Garner
reversed the trend of the Court by denying the state the power to en-
join the union activity if it would have been an unfair labor practice
subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB. Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch28 amplified the Garner ruling by holding that if the union conduct
would be an unfair labor practice under the NLRA, the state was not
free to act even if the union activity violated a state policy other than
labor policy such as restraint of trade. The state was still free to act
where the union activity violated state policy but did not amount to a
federal unfair labor practice as in the Briggs-Stratton29 case. There
the union's conduct was in violation of the Wisconsin Act. Although
there was some coercion in the case, the Court based its finding on the
fact that the union's conduct while harassing the employer did not seek
any specific end. The NLRA only gives the NLRB jurisdiction
where the objectives are unlawful and makes no provision for the
methods by which the employees seek these ends other than protecting
the right of the employees to act in concert.3 0
In United Construction Workers v. Laburnum,3 1 the Court upheld
an award of damages by a state court in a common law tort action for
violent and intimidating acts by a labor union. The conduct on which
the action was based would have constituted an unfair labor practice.
The Court distinguished this case from Garner stating that the decision
there was aimed at preventing a duplication of remedies 3 2 Since there
-'A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941).
" Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor, 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
"Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949).
'Plumbers Union v. Graham, 345 U. S. 192 (1953).
-'348 U. S. 468 (1955).
" International Union v. W. E. R. B., 336 U. S. 245 (1949).
The Court in Briggs-Stratton gave § 7 of the NLRA a restricted interpre-
tation when it said "No longer can any state ... treat otherwise lawful activities
to aid unionization as an illegal conspiracy. But because legal conduct may not be
made illegal by concert, it does not mean that otherwise illegal conduct is made legal
by concert." International Union v. W. E. IR B., 336 U. S. 245, 258 (1949).
51 347 U. S. 656 (1954)
. Id. at 663 where the Court said "In the Garner case, Congress had provided
a federal administrative remedy, supplemented by judicial procedure for its enforce-
ment, with which the state injunctive procedure conflicted. Here Congress has
neither provided nor suggested any substitute for the traditional state court
procedure for collecting damages for injuries caused by tortious conduct."
19571
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
is no provision in the NLRA for compensation for injuries caused
by unfair labor practices, the state tort remedy was not in conflict with
any federal remedy. 3
The Court, in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, reviewed and summarized
all the important decisions it had made in cases involving federal-state
jurisdiction over labor relations. It would seem that the Court had
defined the relationship as closely as the vagueness of the NLRA on
this point allows, except for the ". .. penumbral area" which Justice
Frankfurter in his opinion said "... can be rendered progressively clear
only by the course of litigation. 8 4
The power of a state to regulate labor disputes and activities prior
to the U. A. W. case may be summarized as follows:
(1) Peaceful employee or union activity per se is not enjoinable.
(2) Peaceful employee or union activity may be enjoined if the con-
duct or the objectives sought are violative of declared state policy, unless
the activity is either
(a) protected by section 7 of the NLRA as one of the rights
of employees -to act in concert for their mutual benefit,85 or
(b) amounts to an unfair labor practice under the NLRA and
the NLRB has jurisdiction over the conduct.
If the activity is not precluded from the states as falling within the ex-
ceptions noted, the state may exercise its power through an administra-
tive procedure for labor regulation since it falls in that area which is
neither prohibited nor protected by the NLRA.86
(3) If there is a state remedy available in a labor dispute which would
be operative independently of any state or federal labor policy and the
remedy is one which the NLRB has no power to grant, the state
may exercise its jurisdiction to grant the remedy.37
(4) A state is precluded from enforcing through preventive remedies
its labor law or labor policy over conduct for which the NLRA
provides a federal administrative remedy. It may, however, exercise its
traditional power to prevent violence and preserve the peace.
By considering it inconsequential in the U. A. W. case that the state
exercised its police power through an agency dealing with labor relations,
the Court has further blurred the relationship of the state to the
NLRB, since state judicial power to prevent violence was already
recognized by the Court. The majority argued that a labor board of
" See The Supreme Court, 1953 Term, 68 HAM. L. REv. 96, 143 (1955) for
comparison of the Laburmm and Garner cases.
3"348 U. S. at 480.
3" "If the conduct does not fall within the provisions of § 8 of the Taft-Hartley
Act, it may fall within the protection of § 7 as concerted activity for the purpose of
mutual aid or protection." Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U. S. 468, 478-79 (1955).
'6 International Union v. W. E. R. B., 336 U. S. 245 (1949).
17 United Construction Workers v. Laburnum, 347 U. S. 656 (1954).
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the state would probably be more favorable to the interests of labor than
a purely judicial court. While this may be true of the Wisconsin Board
involved here, it is a dubious assumption to make of states in general.
Violence on a picket line is undesirable in any state but the majority
ruling enables a state administrative agency to assume jurisdiction at
its own discretion in a labor dispute subject to the provisions of the
NLRA, if it finds any coercion present. This could be done even
though the coercion factor may be very slight in a labor dispute and
possibly unsanctioned by the union leadership. Since the NLRB3
cannot act until an unfair labor practice charge has been made,38 the
employer can secure the protection he desires from the state agency and
deprive the NLRB of an apportunity to adjudicate the merits of his
case, by not filing a charge with the NLRB.3 9 The state agency, in
effect, is allowed to regulate conduct subject to the jurisdiction of the
NLRB on the authority of state legislation patterned after the
NLRA, using an administrative remedy that duplicates that available
through the NLRB.
Since the NLRA is vague as to the proper relationship of the
state and the NLRB, the ultimate answer to the myriad problems
raised by the jurisdictional question will lie with the Congress rather than
the courts. A partial solution to the problem raised by the U. A. W.
case would be for Congress to make it mandatory that a charge be filed
with the NLRB within a specified period after any state relief had
been sought. Then, the NLRB could, at its discretion, request a
federal court to enjoin the state proceeding if such were necessary to
protect its jurisdiction.40 It is to be hoped that the Congress will include
a clarification of the jurisdictional question in any future changes which
may be made in the NLRA.
J. HALBERT CONOLY
Z The NLRB has consistently interpreted § 10 (b) of the NLRA as
only giving it jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice when the aggrieved party
has filed a charge and thus the party who may be alleged to be guilty of an unfair
labor practice has no standing to bring its own possibly wrongful conduct to the
board's attention.
"In Capitol Service v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 501 (1954), the Court held that
the NLRB could, at its discretion, request a federal court to enjoin a state
injunction against the same conduct and acts over which the NLRB seeks to
exercise its exclusive jurisdiction (as laid down by the Court in Garner v.
Teamsters, 346 U. S. 485 (1954). Thus the Court allowed the NLRB to
come within the exception to the general rule of the Judicial Code that a court of
the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state
court except ". . . where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction." 28 U. S. C. § 2283
(1952). See Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U. S.
511 (1955), The Supreme Court, 1954 Term, 69 HARv. L. REv. 119, 180 (1956),
for a discussion of the applicability of § 2283 of the Judicial Code to enjoin state
proceedings in a labor dispute.10 Ibid.
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